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BOOK REVIEW
The Law and Processes of Post-Conviction Remedies. By Ira P.
Robbins.' St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co. 1982. Pp.
xvii, 506.
2
Reviewed by Larry W. Yackle

There are days when the availability of the federal writ of habeas
corpus as a vehicle for challenging criminal convictions collaterally
seems assured. The arrival of Professor Robbins' new casebook is itself
strong, affirmative evidence. At last a major publishing house has
acknowledged that the great body of habeas corpus statutes, rules,
and precedents warrants a full-length, hard-bound casebook for classroom use. Implicitly, surely, the publisher assumes that the postconviction writ is here to stay, that it forms a stable and legitimate
part of our jurisprudence. 3 At the same time, some members of the
Court, particularly Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, have
launched a multi-faceted assault on the availability of federal collateral review.
The Chief Justice focuses upon the reliability and finality of state
court judgments of factual guilt. Once a state judge or jury has
reached a conviction judgment, he is loath then to upset that judgment, effectively, by identifying legal error in collateral proceedings
in the federal forum. On the one hand, he makes a fundamental value
judgment, preferring the ascertainment of factual guilt to the protection of constitutional safeguards that may, or may not, enhance the
state courts' pursuit of accurate results. He questions whether federal
habeas is not, after all, an "endless quest for technical errors unrelated
to guilt or innocence." '4 On the other hand, he finds that the delay
associated with post-conviction review poses an intolerable challenge
to the finality of state criminal judgments. Legal error may not be
discovered until years after the state court trial. By then, the case is
cold. Memories fade, witnesses and evidence are lost, and the possibility of convicting the petitioner in a new trial is undercut accordingly.
In this regard, the Chief Justice argues that the applicable rules should
be amended to permit summary dismissal of petitions raising stale
claims "when delay has prejudiced the State's ability to retry the

( Copyright reserved 1983 by Larry W. Yackle
1. Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law.
2. Professor of Law, University of Alabama.
3. I have tried to describe the system of federal post-conviction review in an annually
supplemented manual on the subject. L. YACKLE, POsT-CoNvICrION REMEDIES (1981).
4. Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief Justice of the
United States, 67 A.B.A. J. 290, 292 (1981).
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petitioner." 5 These views are hardly innovative. They have been
sounded before in various quarters, and they have been roundly rejected by the judiciary of a society that treasures respect for constitutional safeguards guaranteeing fair treatment even to the guilty and
that resists the notion that it is ever "too late" to worry about the
6
violation of constitutional rights.
Anticipating, perhaps, that attempts to abrogate post-conviction
habeas or to narrow its scope forthrightly are unlikely to succeed,
Justice Rehnquist has taken a different tack. At virtually every opportunity, he has seized upon the most technical bases for denying postconviction review in the federal forum. It seems plain that if he could
manage the necessary majority from among his colleagues, he, too,
would forestall the routine pursuit of federal habeas relief as a sequel
to state criminal trial and direct review. His resort to rigid technical
barriers presents an alternative, procedural route to that substantive
end. Justice Rehnquist's progress along that path bears watching for it
is his approach, not Chief Justice Burger's, that poses the more serious
threat to the maintenance of post-conviction habeas. He would eschew any frontal assault and, instead, attack at the flank, throwing
up procedural barriers wherever possible. Professor Robbins' book,
good as it is, may have a slim market even now.' If Justice Rehnquist
has his way, there may be no market at all. 8

5. Spalding v. Aiken, 103 S. Ct. 1795, 1796 (1983) (statement concerning the denial of
certiorari).
6. The Nixon Administration proposed legislation that would have limited the scope of
federal habeas to claims related to factual guilt, but Congress failed to act on the bill. S. 567,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The Nixon bill was discussed and criticized in Meyer & Yackle,
Collateral Challenges to Criminal Convictions, 21 U. KAN. L. REV. 259, 270 n.37 (1973). The
Court's decisions in the wake of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), have steered wide of any
suggestion that habeas should be confined to "guilt-related" claims. See infra notes 62-67 and
accompanying text. Regarding finality, the rules the Chief Justice would amend were themselves
proposed by the Court and adopted by Congress as recently as 1976. Rule 9(a) of the § 2254
rules, effective since 1977, permits summary dismissal for unreasonable delay only when the
respondent is prejudiced in responding to the applicant's habeas allegations. On the general
question of tardy claims, the Court said in United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 (1947), that
habeas is available "without limit of time," and more recently in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 323 (1979), that the habeas courts' duty to entertain federal claims reflects "the belief that
the 'finality' of a deprivation of liberty through the invocation of the criminal sanction is simply
not to be achieved at the expense of a constitutional right ....
7. Few American law schools now offer courses concerned primarily with federal habeas
corpus. Existing courses are usually tied to clinical programs in which students assist prison
inmates under the supervision of faculty. See Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal
Services, Providing Legal Services to Prisoners, 8 GA. L. REV. 363 (1974). Professor Robbins
developed his course materials when he was Director of the Kansas Defender Project, the oldest
prisoner assistance clinic in the country. See Wilson, Legal Assistance Project at Leavenworth,
24 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 254 (1966). Cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1969) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (mentioning the Kansas program).
8. State post-conviction remedies might survive the demise of federal habeas corpus, but
the operation of an individual state's procedures would be unlikely to demand a law school
course. At all events, this particular book, concerned almost entirely with federal post-conviction
habeas, would hardly be suitable.
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Even the casual observer knows that post-conviction habeas has
always been a controversial subject. The debate regarding its desirability has long raged and rages still in any available forum." At
present, however, there is a difference. Just as teaching materials have
become available for ordinary law school courses, Justice Rehnquist
seems prepared to dismantle the system of federal post-conviction
review that forms the core of those materials and, indeed, the structure of American criminal justice. The question on the floor is
whether Justice Rehnquist can persuade the other Justices to ally
themselves with him. The answer to that question, if there is one, lies
in an appraisal of post-conviction habeas as it has evolved in this
century and an exploration of the Supreme Court's record in the field
in the last decade.
On close examination, the available evidence suggests that Justice
Rehnquist will fail in the task he has apparently set for himself. The
other Justices are more willing to condemn post-conviction habeas in
their rhetoric than to alter the system of collateral review in any
substantive way. Their tendency is to nip at the beast, to worry it, but
rarely to seek lethal holds. Several Justices have complained in print
that post-conviction habeas is costly, that it antagonizes the state
courts and frustrates the finality of their judgments. Yet when the full
Court has addressed the system of post-conviction review, little genuine damage has been done. The post-conviction writ is alive and well
and likely to stay that way. Accordingly, I come away convinced that
Professor Robbins' book treats materials of enormous, current significance.
9. The post-conviction writ is currently threatened from another direction. The Reagan
Administration has proposed extensive amendments to the habeas statutes which would dramatically restructure the present system of federal collateral review. The Administration's Habeas
Corpus Reform Act was first presented to Congress in a communication from the Attorney
General on March 3, 1982. The package was introduced in the Senate by way of S. 2216, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) and in the House by way of H.R. 6050, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. (1982).
Hearings were held in the Senate on April 1, 1982. See The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982:
Hearingson S. 2216 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Essentially
the same program was introduced on several later occasions-until all pending bills died when
Congress concluded. More recently, the Administration's proposals have been introduced in the
98th Congress as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983. S.829, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983). The Judiciary Committee has approved the habeas proposals and reported them to
the full Senate as S. 1763. See S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The same legislative
package has also been submitted in other bills. See S.217, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc.
S401 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983); H.R. 50, 98th Cong., 1st Seas., 129 CONG. REc. H41 (daily ed.
Jan. 3, 1983). I have voiced my appraisal of the Reagan program elsewhere. Yackle, The Reagan
Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IowA L. REV. 609 (1983). See also Sallet &
Goodman, Closing the Door to Federal Habeas Corpus: A Comment on Legislative Proposalsto
Restrict Access in State ProceduralDefault Cases, 20 AM. CraM. L. REV. 465 (1983).
Presumably, Professor Robbins will treat the Administration's proposals in a supplement. At
the same time, he should enlarge his present offerings to take account of important new
decisions. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (adopting the "total" exhaustion rule in habeas);
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (applying the Court's present analysis for abortive state
proceedings); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (extending that analysis to cases in
which federal prisoners raise claims that might have been but were not presented at trial in
federal court and rejecting the application of the federal "plain error" rule in federal post-
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I
The criminal justice system in the United States today contemplates
post-conviction review in federal habeas corpus as a key enforcement
device for constitutional standards implicated in state criminal prosecutions. The cases and materials admirably selected and arranged in
Professor Robbins' book tell the story of how that came to be. The
federal courts were not given authority to entertain challenges to
invalid state custody until 1867.10 Even then it was unclear whether
the federal writ would be available after trial, rather than before,
and, certainly, whether the habeas jurisdiction would permit the
lower federal courts to superintend the criminal justice system generally." Those propositions were established later and as a result of
judicial, not legislative, innovation. 2
Although Justice Black resurrected the "incorporation" theory to
serve as the theoretical basis for the Warren Court's substantive interpretations of the fourteenth amendment as it applies in state criminal
cases, 13 it was Justice Frankfurter who, in Brown v. Allen,14 constructed the procedural mechanism through which the Court's decisions could be implemented.15 Even as he resisted wholesale intrusions
by the federal courts into the ordinary enforcement of state criminal
law, Justice Frankfurter recognized that acceptance of new federal

conviction proceedings). Indeed, it appears that in 1982 a casebook on pubc-uuni,-don iuemedies
was both overdue (in light of the great body of materials already in existence) and premature (in
light of the pendency of so many important cases). And this in addition to the Administration's
interest in legislative action.
10. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Prior to the Civil War, under
authority established by the Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal courts were limited to examining
challenges to invalid federal custody. 1 Stat. 81-82. I lay aside in this review the persuasive, but
controversial, contention that the suspension clause provides a constitutional basis for issuing the
writ. Compare Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605 with Collings, Habeas Corpusfor Convicts- ConstitutionalRight or Legislative Grace? 40 CALIF. L. REV.
335 (1952)..
11. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963).
12. The literature on these developments, in addition to Professor Bator's work, is excellent
and voluminous. See Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the
justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84 (1959); Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme
Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (1965); Developments in the Law-Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970). Of course, as might be expected, observers differ
on even basic issues. Professor Peller, for example, has mounted a powerful attack on the Bator
thesis, supra note 11, that post-conviction habeas was essentially inaugurated in Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953). Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARv. C. R.C. L. L. REv. 579 (1982).
13. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See C. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 476-88 (10th ed. 1980).
14. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
15. The opinion denominated as that of the Court was written by Justice Reed. It was,
however, Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion that spoke for the majority regarding the critical
question of the effect state court proceedings would be accorded in federal habeas corpus. 344
U.S. at 488. In an effort to obtain an empirical base for the habeas structure he wished to
establish, Justice Frankfurter conducted a survey of 126 cases entertained by the district courts
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standards, announced by an increasingly unpopular Supreme Court,
would require some federal backstop. Plainly, the Court itself could
not hope to supervise scores of local courts. Indeed, for that reason,
Justice Frankfurter insisted that Supreme Court discretionary refusals
to review criminal convictions on writ of certiorari should be accorded
no meaning whatever touching the merits. 16 The working assumption,
appreciated by anyone familiar with the Court's caseload, was that
the Court sits not to correct errors made below, but to orchestrate the
development of federal law using cases of the moment as vehicles for
change when it is needed. 17 Day-to-day review of the state courts'
work must come from the lower federal courts, acting as surrogates.' 8
No one proposed, of course, that the federal courts should displace the
state courts entirely or that the habeas jurisdiction should ultimately
result in the effective removal of federal issues to the federal forum,
leaving the state courts with responsibility only for making state law
determinations and ascertaining factual guilt.' 9 That would have been
theoretically unsound and practically unworkable.20 The federal
courts sitting in habeas were to pose an effective threat of review,
thereby forcing the states to take seriously their responsibility to respect federal safeguards. 2' There was and is little evidence that the
state courts would vigorously enforce the Court's new standards but
for the22incentive provided by the federal habeas courts waiting in the
wings.
Once the system of federal post-conviction review was in place and
the state courts were convinced that they must meet their obligations
during the Supreme Court's October 1950 Term. He set forth his results in an appendix to his
opinion in Brown. Id. at 514. The study convinced Justice Frankfurter that the federal habeas
courts could reasonably be recruited to the service for which he wanted them, without undue
interference with the ordinary functioning of the state criminal courts. A decade later, the
famous partnership between Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan fleshed out the Frankfurter framework in the great trilogy of habeas cases decided in 1963. See infra note 30.
16. 344 U.S. at 489-97.
17. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 16 (1961) (stating the obvious
truth that the Court's primary responsibility is to decide questions that transcend the needs and
interests of the parties to the dispute which provides the occasion for judicial pronouncement).
18. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. See Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that neither the
Constitution nor the federal habeas statute contemplates such a plan).
20. Congress could, presumably, provide for the determination of all federal issues in the
federal forum, but the more likely means to that end would he an expansion of the federal courts'
removal jurisdiction. See Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966); accord Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 106 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Inasmuch as it is often the very
purpose of procedural safeguards to ensure the reliability of fact-finding at trial, it would be
foolish in the extreme to propose that the state courts might ascertain the facts by any procedure
they please, leaving the federal habeas corpus courts thereafter to effectively upset the state
courts' judgments in virtually every instance.
21. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-64 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. See Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures,52 VA. L.
REv. 286, 290-91 (1966). It was hardly coincidental, for example, that the Court's momentous
decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
were announced on the same day.
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or find their judgments effectively upset, an entirely rational, even
efficient, partnership could emerge. 3 The state courts would have
initial responsibility for developing the facts relevant to federal claims
and spreading those facts on the record. 24 If they were unable to do so
in the ordinary course of trial and direct review, they would be
encouraged to establish post-conviction remedies of their own for the
purpose. 25 The state courts would also make the first determination of
federal "mixed" and legal questions arising from the facts 26 based on
the long-standing requirement in habeas corpus that state judicial
remedies be exhausted before applicants seek federal relief. 27 So long
as the facts were fairly found, through process giving the assurance of
accuracy, they would be accepted by the federal courts. In Justice
Frankfurter's terms, only factual findings arrived at in state proceedings having some "vital flaw" would be rejected in favor of a de novo,
federal evidentiary hearing. 28 Later, In Townsend v. Sain 2 9 Chief
Justice Warren announced more exacting standards for determining
whether federal fact-finding would be mandatory. 30 State court determinations of legal questions would not be accepted in the same way,
but after thorough and sensitive state court adjudication it could be
expected that the federal courts would be able to render independent
judgment with some dispatch. If all went as planned, there would be
few instances in which a different decision on the merits would be
reached. The system was more complex than this, of course. The

23. See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE
L. J. 1035 (1977).
24. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 503-07 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., for the majority)
(indicating that the state courts may determine the relevant facts in the course of exhaustion but
that often there is no adequate record of their work upon which the federal habeas courts can
rely).
25. The Court has never held explicitly that the states must provide post-conviction review of
criminal judgments. Cf. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) (avoiding the issue). But see
Note, Effect of the Federal Constitution in Requiring State Post-Conviction Remedies, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (1953) (presenting the constitutional arguments). Indeed, in McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894), even the availability of direct review by appeal was held not to be
constitutionally mandatory. Cf. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949) (referring to the
requirement that the states provide some "clearly defined method by which [litigants] may raise
claims of denial of federal rights"). State collateral review mechanisms have, however, been
established in most jurisdictions. See Avichai, CollateralAttacks on Convictions (I): The Probability and Intensity of Filing, 1977 A.B.F. REs. J. 319 (surveying the operation of post-conviction
procedures in four states).
26. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., for the majority).
27. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). The exhaustion doctrine, established by the Court
itself in the Royall case, was written into the habeas statutes in 1948. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
28. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., for the majority).
29. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
30. The Townsend decision formed, with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the great trilogy of "guideline" decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court in the same year. In Townsend, the Court set forth standards for determining
when a federal evidentiary hearing was mandatory; in Noia, the Court fashioned its response to
procedural default in state court; and in Sanders, the Court established rules for disposing of
successive applications for federal post-conviction relief.
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exhaustion doctrine's application in a range of situations caused no
end of difficulties, 3' and in order to ensure against the frustration of
federal claims through unsympathetic fact-finding, the federal habeas
courts required broad discretion to conduct their own evidentiary
hearings when appropriate. 32 Still, a fundamentally sound division of
labor was established. That framework promised to strike the proper
balance between state interests and prerogatives on the one hand and
33
federal concerns for the protection of individual liberty on the other.
The resolution of the difficulties presented by abortive state proceedings illustrates the point.3 4 If, for example, a prisoner failed to
observe a state contemporaneous objection rule and the state courts,
for that reason, refused to entertain a tardy federal claim, the federal
effect of the state judgment, based on procedural grounds, was problematic. After a brief flirtation with the exhaustion doctrine as the
proper frame of reference,35 at least some Justices turned to the rules
governing direct review in the Supreme Court, concluding that state
judgments resting upon adequate and independent state grounds
should foreclose habeas review of federal claims that might have been,
but were not, treated in state court. 36 That approach was flawed for a
number of reasons. It sent entirely the wrong signal to the state courts
concerned. The Court had established in Brown that state judgments
on the merits of federal claims would be re-examined in federal
habeas. Deference to state procedural grounds of decision suggested
that the habeas forum would be barred if the state courts could
manage to avoid the merits and to rest judgment, unfavorable to the
prisoner, on a state procedural basis. At best, such an approach
embraced the anomalous "philosophy" that the federal courts should
"grant a second review where the state has granted one but . . . deny
any review at all where the state has granted none."' 37 At worst, it
encouraged the states to throw up procedural barriers to the adjudication of federal claims in order to take advantage of opportunities to

31. Compare, e.g., Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950) (holding that state prisoners must
seek discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States as part of the exhaustion of
state remedies) with Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 488-97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.) (holding for
the majority that the Court's summary denial of certiorari should not be taken as a judgment on
the merits) and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-38 (1963) (overruling Darr).
32. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963).
33. See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 n.6 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (justifying
habeas on the ground that prisoners' paramount interest in freedom from "custody" warrants the
relitigationof federal claims).
34. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L.
REv. 1315 (1961) (coining the term and suggesting the analysis later adopted in Noia).
35. E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959) (apparently applying the doctrine to state
remedies that had been available to the prisoner in the past). See Hart, supra note 12, at 112-14
(criticizing the analysis in Irvin and proposing that the exhaustion doctrine applied only to state
procedures still available to the prisoner at the time a federal petition was filed).
36. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 412 (1959) (Harlan J., dissenting).
37. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 552 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting).
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foreclose state litigation, and federal post-conviction review into the
bargain, whenever a would-be
habeas petitioner failed to comply
38
with state rules of procedure.
For these reasons and more, the Court subsequently abandoned the
adequate state ground doctrine.39 In its place, Fay v. Noia40 held that
abortive state proceedings would preclude federal habeas review of
the merits only if the petitioner's default constituted a "deliberate
bypass" of state procedures. 4' The standard, borrowed from the law
of constitutional waiver generally, was that the prisoner must have
knowingly and intentionally relinquished the opportunity to litigate
further in state court. 42 Only if the petitioner had personally participated in a deliberate decision to forego further state litigation could
federal habeas review be foreclosed. 43 The Noia approach was ingenious. It protected both state and federal courts from manipulative
litigants and at the same time prevented state procedural barriers
from frustrating the adjudication of federal claims. By refusing to give
federal effect to most forfeiture sanctions in state court, Noia encouraged the states to eliminate procedural snarls and to reach the merits
of federal claims. By requiring that the petitioner participate personally in any default later judged a "deliberate bypass," Noia sharply
reduced the likelihood that a blameless defendant might suffer the
consequences of counsel's procedural blunders. It was as plain then as
it is today that most procedural defaults can be traced to defense
counsel. 44 Thus it might have been possible to hold in some cases that
counsel's mistakes constituted ineffective assistance, an independent
basis upon which habeas relief might be granted. It was far more

38. Hart, supra note 12, at 118.
39. More recently, the Court has revived the doctrine in habeas cases in which the procedural default occurred at the trial stage of state proceedings. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977), discussed injra in the text accompanying notes 75-79.
40. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
41. Id. at 438. It seems clear that even this much deference to state procedural default/
forfeiture rules was accorded grudgingly. Justice Brennan's elaborate opinion for the Court in
Noia signalled that prisoners suffering abortive state proceedings would in the future be able
routinely to gain federal habeas review of their underlying federal claims. Indeed, it would be
rare that a habeas court, applying essentially the "clean hands" doctrine borrowed from chancery, would refuse to entertain a claim because it had been deliberately held back in state court
and "saved" for the federal forum. See id. at 439 (insisting that the "deliberate bypass" rule
should not be taken as an invitation to "introduce legal fictions into federal habeas corpus" by
adopting rules by which procedural default not constituting a deliberate choice might be deemed
a "waiver" of further state process).
42. Id. at 439; cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (cited in Noia as furnishing the
applicable standard).
43. Noia, 372 U.S. at 439; accord Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 517 (1972) (noting that
any "waiver"of state process "must be the product of an understanding and knowing decision by
the petitioner himself"). See generally Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation,Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1262 (1966).
44. See Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 984 (1965) (ascribing
most counsel error to "inadvertence" tied to "ineptitude" or "an understandable failure of
competent lawyers fully to perceive legal niceties in the rush of litigation").
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effective, however, to overlook errors for which the prisoner bore no
responsibility and to permit the federal courts to reach the merits of
underlying federal claims that were foreclosed in state court through
45
the operation of a forfeiture sanction imposed for counsel's default.
Ii
It is against this background that Justice Rehnquist's widely-noted
forays against the post-conviction writ must be understood. A few
examples from his recent opinions in the field will suffice to demonstrate his overarching distaste for federal collateral review. As one
might expect, he has been most vociferous when speaking for himself
alone. Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Coleman v.
Balkcom, 46 for example, he argued that post-conviction habeas in
death penalty cases has resulted in a "stalemate in the administration
of federal constitutional law" and urged the Court to grant review in
the merits and cut off further
more capital cases in order to determine
47
resort to the lower federal courts.
Other similar instances in which he has attempted to undercut the
writ are less well known. In an opinion in chambers in McCarthy v.
Harper,48 Justice Rehnquist stayed the mandate of the Ninth Circuit,
which had awarded habeas relief to the petitioner, because no judge
had issued a certificate of probable cause for an appeal. 49 Then, in
Jeffries v. Barksdale,0 he dissented from the denial of certiorari in
another habeas case, arguing again that since no certificate of probable cause had been issued, the case was not properly within the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. The prisoner's petition for certiorari, he
insisted, should have been dismissed on that ground, rather than
denied-asthough the Court had jurisdiction and had simply decided
not to entertain the merits. The Jeffries dissent soon earned Justice
Rehnquist a measure of facial egg. In the next case, Davis v. Jacobs, '
45. The Noia approach brilliantly answered virtually all questions. It circumvented state
forfeiture rules that might otherwise have frustrated the adjudication of federal claims, permitting the federal habeas courts to ignore such rules without actually holding them unconstitutional. Cf. Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 557-58 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the prisoner should not have been denied a federal forum because the state forfeiture
sanction applied in state court was so harsh as to violate the due process clause). Similarly, it
permitted adjudication of the merits without a threshold determination that counsel's failure to
comply with state law constituted ineffective assistance. But see generally Bines, Remedying
Ineffective Representationin Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV.
927 (1973) (suggesting that the development of substantive sixth amendment standards was
retarded in the process).
46. 451 U.S. 949 (1981).
47. Id. at 957. See also Estelle v. Jurek, 450 U.S. 1014 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 442 U.S. 1301 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (in chambers); Evans v.
Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (in chambers).
48. 449 U.S. 1309 (1981).
49. Id. at 1310. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
50. 453 U.S. 914 (1981).
51. 454 U.S. 911 (1982).
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he was forced to acknowledge that in House v. Mayo,12 the Court had
held that a certificate of probable cause is necessary only to the
exercise of the Court's statutory certiorari jurisdiction and that the
Court can entertain a habeas case using its authority to issue the
common law writ without one. Presented with ample authority for
the course of action adopted by the full Court in Jeffries,
he could only
3
urge, unpersuasively, that House be overruled.1
In yet another instance of what may charitably be called inadequate research, Justice Rehnquist dissented from the denial of certiorari in Duckworth v. Owen.5 4 He argued that the circuit court had
effectively held that the states were constitutionally bound to observe
the Federal Rules of Evidence in their own courts. It was, however,
plain, at least implicitly, that the circuit had merely held that a
federal habeas corpus court properly follows the federal rules in a
federal evidentiary hearing.
At best, Justice Rehnquist's penchant for fly-specking the work of
the lower courts in habeas bespeaks a general distaste for federal
collateral review and an inclination to limit the operation of postconviction habeas wherever possible. At worst, his opinions reveal a
cynical attempt to frustrate habeas in any convenient manner. His
55
sentiments, clearly expressed in another dissent in Snead v. Stringer,
can hardly be mistaken: "It is scarcely surprising that fewer and fewer
capable lawyers can be found to serve on state benches when they may
find their considered decisions overturned by the ruling of a single
federal district judge on grounds as tenuous as these." '
Other Justices, to be sure, have occasionally expressed sympathy
with Justice Rehnquist's position. Justice Powell has insisted that in
some instances the benefit of habeas review is "outweighed by the
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice. "'5 1 Justice Blackmun has complained that the "commonlaw scholars of the past" would hardly recognize the writ today.5
Justice O'Connor, the author of most of the Court's recent habeas
decisions, is, if anything, even more sympathetic to Justice Rehnquist's
views. She has been at pains to consider the "costs" of post-conviction
review in habeas and, indeed, has voiced the suspicion that "[s]tate
courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply exist-

52. 324 U.S. 42 (1946).

53. 454 U.S. at 917-18.
54. 452 U.S. 951 (1981).

55. 454 U.S. 988 (1981).
56. Id. at 993-94.
57. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J.,dissenting) (quoting
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)).
58. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 501 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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ing constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during a
[habeas corpus] proceeding, new constitutional commands."

5

To date, however, Justice Rehnquist has been unable to convince
his colleagues to join him in a campaign against post-conviction habeas generally. In the Coleman case, for example, Justice Stevens
responded to Rehnquist's dissent in a rare opinion concurring in the
Court's decision to deny certiorari review. In measured language, he
pointed out that death-penalty cases-are hardly appropriate instances
in which to "experiment with accelerated procedures." 60 In Davis,
Justice Stevens again took the floor against the Rehnquist position,
explaining that it makes little practical difference whether the Court
dismisses a petition for statutory certiorari or denies one for the comtrue intentions in all
mon law writ. Any effort to explain the Justices'
6
cases would be burdensome and fruitless. '
Most importantly, laying aside the Justices' opinions, there is little
indication in their decisions that they are in retreat from basic principles. For a time, the decision in Stone v. Powell6 2 was mistaken for the

59. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 n.33 (1982).
60. 451 U.S. at 953. I acknowledge the evidence in some recent cases that the full Court has
neglected Justice Stevens' advice and bowed to pressures for expedition in habeas cases involving
death row petitioners. See, e.g., Alabama v. Evans, 103 S. Ct. 1736 (1983) (dissolving a stay
issued by a district court); Brooks v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 1490 (1982) (denying an eleventh hour
request for a stay of execution even though a district judge had issued a certificate of probable
cause for an appeal); see also Goldberg, The Supreme Court Reaches Out and Touches Someone-Fatally, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7 (1982) (discussing similar haste in other cases).
It is too early to tell whether the Justices mean actually to push the lower courts toward
truncated adjudication in capital cases. The most important precedent to date is Barefoot v.
Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983), handed down at the very end of the October 1982 Term.
Speaking for a majority that included Justice Rehnquist but not Justice Stevens (on this issue),
Justice White offered something for everybody. The question at bar, pretermitted sub silentio in
Brooks, was whether the Fifth Circuit had acted properly in denying a stay of execution to a
death row prisoner whose habeas petition had been denied by the district court. In Barefoot, as
in Brooks, the district judge had issued a certificate of probable cause for an appeal, thus
indicating that the appeal had substantial merit. On the one hand, Justice White approved the
circuit's practice of determining the stay question at the same time it considered the merits of the
appeal and denying the stay without clearly affirming the district court's denial of habeas relief.
See 103 S. Ct. at 3391-93. That, to be sure, was to accept expedited review in capital cases. On
the other hand, Justice White reaffirmed the rule that when a district judge issues a certificate,
the prisoner must be given an opportunity to address the merits on appeal, and the circuit must
in fact decide the merits. If the appeal cannot receive due consideration before the prisoner's
scheduled execution, a stay must be issued. Id. at 3394.
I should have preferred a different result. In cases in which a federal judge has found
sufficient merit in an appeal to warrant the issuance of a certificate, it seems only reasonable to
ask the circuit court to treat the merits in the usual course of business. Haste begets error. It is
possible that Barefoot will be taken as a signal to bring less vigor to the consideration of habeas
corpus claims put by death row prisoners. Justice Stevens, for his part, joined Justice Marshall's
bitter dissent on the threshold question in that case. Id. at 3400 ( Stevens, J., concurring in the
majority's judgment on the merits of the appeal). Still, it remains to be seen whether the lower
courts will read Barefoot in the same way.
61. 454 U.S. at 914-15.
62. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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advance force of a general assault upon Brown. 3 In Stone, the Court
held that a state prisoner may not be granted habeas relief on the
ground that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment was
introduced at trial, if the state provided an opportunity for "full and
fair" litigation of the exclusionary rule claim in state court. 4 To the
extent that Stone deferred to state court judgments on the merits, and
focused the habeas courts' attention upon the state court procedures
employed to produce those results, it seemed reasonable to predict
that the same analysis would be exported to other cases, in which
other claims unrelated to the prisoner's "factual guilt" or other judgemade procedural rules were in issue. 5 More recent decisions, set forth
in Professor Robbins' book, make it clear that the Court has nothing of
the sort in mind.66 On reflection, Stone appears to be only another in a
line of recent cases in which the Court has undercut not habeas, but
67
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.
Nor do the Court's cases regarding fact-finding in state court bode
ill for the writ. The Justices have steered well clear of Townsend,
63. See Letter from the Congressional Research Service to Senator Charles Mathias (July 13,
1976), printed in Federal Habeas Corpus: Hearings on S. 1314 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in the Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13, 17-19 (1978) (comparing the analysis in Stone to then-Assistant Attorney General
Rehnquist's 1973 testimony on behalf of a Nixon administration bill that would have limited the
issues cognizable in habeas); cf. Stone, 428 U.S. at 515-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (worrying
that the majority's analysis might eliminate a range of issues from the scope of the writ).
64. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494. The definition of the Stone "bpportunity" for "full and fair"
litigation has evaded confident and uniform treatment in the lower courts. See Shoemaker v.
Riley, 103 S. Ct. 266 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (noting the
divided authorities and arguing that the Court should resolve existing conflicts among the
circuits); cf. Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v.
Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1982) (arguing that "systemic" fourth amendment claims can be
entertained in the federal forum).
65. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 23. In an apparently important footnote in Stone,
Justice Powell wrote that "[r]esort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure
that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on
values important to our system of government." 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. See also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (declining the invitation to extend Stone
to claims of race discrimination in the selection of granil jurors-even though such claims do not
go to the reliability of fact determination at trial); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)
(passing over an opportunity to apply the Stone analysis to a sixth amendment exclusionary rule
claim).
67. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (refusing to permit grand jury
witnesses to object to questions based upon information obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment); cf. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 702 n.9 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing that fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims should not be entertained in habeas);
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (same). Judge
Celebrezze has recently expressed the view that Stone is based, simply enough, on the judgment
that if a fourth amendment claim has been considered at trial and on direct review in the state
courts, and the question still seems close enough to warrant a petition for federal habeas relief,
the outcome, whatever it might be, will not serve the purpose of encouraging police officers to
adhere to identified and identifiable fourth amendment standards. Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522,
525-26 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Shoemaker v. Riley, 103 S. Ct. 266 (1982). See generally
Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in
Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436 (1980) (exploring Stone in some depth).
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failing even to take up the question when a federal evidentiary hearing must or should be held."' The only activity has occurred in cases
demanding a construction of section 2254(d).11 The primary case is
Sumner v. Mata, which reached the Court twice. Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the Court initially, but he was clearly unable to deal the
writ more than passing damage. Mata 1 70 held, first, that findings by
state appellate courts are entitled to the presumption described in the

68. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30; cf. In re Wainwright, 678 F.2d 951, 953 (11th
Cir. 1982) (stating that Mata "in no way speaks" to the threshold questions "if and when a
federal habeas court may hold an evidentiary hearing").
69. Developments in the Law, spra note 12, at 1122 n.46 (explaining that the statute does
not deal with the question whether a federal evidentiary hearing must or should be held but
rather "assumes that a hearing is to be held and attempts to decide if the state's factual
conclusions are to be deemed presumptively correct at that hearing"). Accord, LaVallee v. Delle
Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 701 n.2 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Section 2254(d) provides:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court
of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the
State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding,
written opinion, or other reliable and adequate indicia, shall be presumed to be
correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the
respondent shall admit(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate
to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court
proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding;
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as
provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the
record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported
by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or
more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7),
inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the
respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole,
does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the
applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the
State court was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
70. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
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statute and, second, that when the lower federal courts do not accord
the presumption to state findings they must explain why in an opinion. There was language in Mata I suggesting, but hardly holding,
that state determinations of "mixed" questions might be treated as
findings of fact subject to the presumption. 7' Yet when the case came
back before the Court a year later in Mata 11,72 a per curiam expressly
limited the presumption to findings of primary, evidentiary fact.73 All
told, the Court's disposition of Mata was consistent with pre-existing
understandings of section 2254(d).7'
Only in its response to abortive state proceedings has the Court
departed markedly from the Warren Court's framework. While Noia
abandoned the adequate state ground doctrine as the appropriate
reference for contending with petitioners who committed procedural
default in state proceedings, the Court resurrected that doctrine in
Wainwright v. Sykes.75 In another opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the
Court. held that if the state courts refused to consider a prisoner's
federal claim because of procedural default at trial, the federal courts
should defer to the state's procedural ground of decision, unless the
prisoner demonstrates "cause" for the default and "prejudice" from
the error that went uncorrected. 7 The "cause" and "prejudice" stan-

71. Id. at 552 (stating that a circuit court must provide a written explanation of the "2254(d)
factors" when it reaches a different "result" from that of the state courts on the "issue of
impermissibly suggestive identification procedures"); see also id. at 556-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (complaining that the disagreement below was over the "constitutional significance" of
"primary" facts rather than the facts themselves).
72. 455 U.S. 591 (1982).
73. See Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 1981) (treating a suggestive
identification claim on the merits without mention of Mata).
This is not to suggest, of course, that the difference between factual and "mixed" questions is
always clear. The subsequent history of Mata itself is illustrative. After the second remand, the
circuit again considered the question of the deference owed to state court findings and once again
disagreed internally about the nature of key determinations made by the state courts. Compare
Mata v. Sumner, 696 F.2d 1244, 1251 (9th Cir. 1983) (majority opinion) (accepting the Supreme
Court's guidance concerning some issues but insisting that the suggestiveness of pre-trial identification procedures was a "mixed" question to which the statutory presumption could not apply)
with id. at 1262 (Sneed, J., dissenting) (curiously insisting that the state court determination
regarding suggestiveness was subject to the presumption). The Court's more recent per curiam in
Maggio v. Fulford, 103 S. Ct. 2261 (1983), only adds fuel to the fire. See id. at 2264-65 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment) (reading the per curiam to apply the presumption to the question
of a defendant's competency to stand trial and insisting that competency was a "mixed" question
to be determined independently by the federal court); accord id. at 2265 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, J.); id. at 2266 (Marshall, J., dissenting). I have outlined my own views
(and worried that the Court itself disagrees with me) in another forum. See YACKLE, supra note
3, at 233-34 (1983 Supp.).
74. The Court's most recent full dress decision, Marshall v. Lonberger, 103 S. Ct. 843
(1983), adds little to the discussion.
75. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
76. Id. at 84. The "cause" and "prejudice" standards had been developed in previous cases.
See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). The
Court made it clear in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982), that both "cause" and
"prejudice" must be established.
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dards were, accordingly, substituted for the "deliberate bypass"
rule-in cases controlled by Sykes. In such cases the federal habeas
courts no longer ask whether petitioners themselves "waived" the
opportunity to litigate federal claims in state court. 78 They ask, instead, why default occurred and what effect it had on the caseof federal habeas if "cause" and "prejudice"
imposing a "forfeiture"
79
are not shown.
Importantly, however, the Court has not held that innocent petitioners will always be held accountable for the sins of defense counsel.
Deliberate defaults committed for strategic advantage will foreclose
federal habeas under Sykes, whether or not the petitioner participated
80
personally in counsel's decision to forego state process. Counsel's
unintentional defaults, committed out of ignorance or neglect, may
not have the same effect. 8' The question is not free from doubt. In

77. The Sykes analysis is not necessarily applicable in all procedural default cases. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion carefully skirted Noia on its own facts, 433 U.S. at 88 n.12, and the lower
courts have divided over whether, or the extent to which, the "deliberate bypass" rule survives.
Of the several available bases for reconciling Sykes and Noia, the argument that they address
procedural defaults occurring at different stages of state proceedings is most persuasive. The
default in Sykes took place at trial, when counsel's failure to raise a claim prevented the trial
court from avoiding or curing error and when it would have been difficult to involve the
defendant in counsel's tactics anyway. The default in Noia occurred after trial, when there was
no way for the state courts to avoid or cure error without another trial and when matters were in
relative repose so that the client might have been consulted. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91-92 (Burger,
C.J., concurring) (insisting that the "deliberate bypass" rule "was never designed for" and is
"inapplicable to" cases in which the error asserted occurred at trial); id. at 94-95 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Noia had never been applied consistently to demand that the defendant participate in trial tactics). Compare United States ex rel. Spurlock v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354,
361 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that "the rumors of Fay's death are not greatly exaggerated")
with Holcomb v. Murphy, 701 F.2d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1983) (insisting that the Supreme
Court "knows how to overrule a case if it wishes to do so"). See also Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d
634, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981) (distinguishing a failure to appeal
at all from a failure to raise a particular claim on appeal-and suggesting that Noia governs only
the former); cf. Grace v. Butterworth, 635 F.2d 1, 5 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
917 (1981) (declining to "take sides" in the controversy).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
79. The government's briefs in recent habeas cases have pursued the shift from "waiver" to
"forfeiture." See, e.g., Brief for the United States, Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
80. This follows logically from Sykes' treatment of Noia. In Justice Rehnquist's telling, Noia
encouraged "sandbagging" by defense counsel. The tactic is deliberately to build error into a case
by failing to alert the state courts to a federal claim. In some instances, the client will be
acquitted anyway. If that does not happen, counsel will raise the federal claim that was "saved"
for federal habeas corpus. Of course, even the Noia "deliberate bypass" rule would foreclose
habeas review of the claim if the prisoner participated in counsel's strategy. That being the case,
the only "sandbagging" that Noia could have encouraged is intentional procedural defaults about
which the client is not told. Although I find his thinking convoluted, I understand Justice
Rehnquist to have intended Sykes to catch that kind of "sandbagging" and thus to hold prisoners
accountable for trial-level procedural defaults-even if they did not participate in the strategy
adopted by defense counsel.
81. I have to think that, if "sandbagging" is the difficulty, then federal habeas review will be
foreclosed only for deliberate defaults in state court. An analysis of abortive state proceedings
that seeks to discourage counsel from "saving" federal claims for the federal forum cannot
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Engle v. Isaac,"' the Justices passed over an opportunity to hold

squarely that counsel's careless errors can bring about the forfeiture of
both state process and federal habeas review. Writing for the Court,
Justice O'Connor refused in Isaac to accept counsel's argument that
they had not been aware of an available federal claim in time to raise
it and had, accordingly, committed procedural default through ignorance. Citing the authorities in existence at the time of trial, Justice
O'Connor held, in effect, that counsel had known of the claim and
simply had not raised it. 83 No "cause" for that deliberate default
having been shown, she invoked the forfeiture sanction contemplated

reasonably be applied when counsel's default was unintentional. See Garrison v. McCarthy, 653
F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1981); Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1364 (10th Cir. 1981). The Fifth
Circuit's treatment of the issue is ambiguous at best. When Tyler v. Phelps, 622 F.2d 172 (5th
Cir. 1980), first reached the court, the case was remanded for a determination whether "cause"
had been established for counsel's default at trial. In a critical footnote, the court indicated that
"cause" should be found if the default arose from ignorance, mistake, or a misunderstanding of
the applicable law. Id. at 178 n.9. The first opinion was withdrawn, however, upon rehearing.
In a new opinion, the court found it unnecessary to remand the case after all. Reexamination of
the record had convinced the court that the petitioner had already been afforded an opportunity
to demonstrate "cause" and that he had failed to do so. Tyler v. Phelps, 643 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir.
1981). While the court's failure to repeat in its second opinion the substance of the crucial
footnote in its first is perplexing, it is impossible to conclude with confidence that the omission
was intended as a decision on the vital question whether ignorance or neglect may constitute
"cause" within the meaning of Sykes. Importantly, the second opinion expressly declined to
speculate on the true motivations behind the default at bar. Id. at 1101 n.9. Cf. Honeycutt v.
Mahoney, 698 F.2d 213, 220 n.8 (4th Cir. 1983) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (reading the second
opinion in Tyler to imply that "cause" would have been found if counsel had "candidly admitted" that he had been unaware of the federal claim).
82. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
83. Id. at 133. I suspect that some will quarrel with my reading of Isaac. Inasmuch as the
petitioners in the consolidated cases before the Court argued, in part, that their lawyers had not
been aware of the federal claims they might have raised regarding jury instructions, it may be
contended that when Justice O'Connor failed to find "cause," she effectively decided that
unintentional defaults can foreclose federal habeas review. I think, on the contrary, that the
Court's actual language supports my thesis:
We do not suggest that every astute counsel would have [raised] . . .the unconstitutionality of a rule saddling criminal defendants with the burden of proving an
affirmative defense. Every trial presents a myriad of possible claims. Counsel might
have overlooked or chosen to omit respondents' due process argument while pursuing
other avenues of defense. We have long recognized, however, that the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does
not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim. Where the basis of a constitutional claim is available, and other defense
counsel have perceived and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality
counsel against labelling alleged unawareness of the objection as a cause for a
procedural default.
Id. at 133-34. 1 have argued elsewhere that the first five sentences of the excerpt were written in
response to the prisoners' argument that their lawyers rendered ineffective assistance. If that
claim had been sustained, "cause" surely would have been found. Ineffective assistance regarding procedural default surely constitutes a sufficent, but not a necessary, basis for "cause." The
last sentence addresses the prisoners' alternate argument that counsel's inadvertence, short of a
sixth amendment violation, established "cause" for the default. Here, however, Justice O'Connor's previous holding that in these cases defense counsel had been aware of the claim at the time
of trial controls. I do not understand Isaac to speak to a question not before the Court-whether
genuine ignorance or neglect will establish "cause" within the meaning of Sykes. See Yackle,
supra note 9, at 657-60.
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by Sykes. In this context, too, the Court's actual holdings fall well
84
short of the dramatic changes that Justice Rehnquist would prefer.
Professor Robbins supplies ample materials on these and other developments.8 5 He draws on the rich literature in the field and, in
provocative questions and notes, delves into the arcane intricacies of
modern post-conviction practice. 86 The complexity exists, he implic-

84. Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) (stating that the meaning of
"cause" and "prejudice" would be elaborated in future cases) with Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
135 (1982) (stating that "cause" is not a "rigid" concept but will yield to the demands of assuring
against a miscarriage of justice). See generally Comment, Lundy, Isaac and Frady: A.Trilogy of
Habeas Corpus Restraint, 32 CATH. L. REV. 169 (1982); Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus
Review of Unintentionally Defaulted ConstitutionalClaims, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 981 (1982).
For a discussion of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), in which significant damage to the
post-conviction writ was done, see Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus:
An Argument for a Return to First Principles,44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393,424-40 (1983).
85. I find his introductory offerings regarding overarching, philosophical issues useful to put
in perspective both the critical role that habeas plays in the criminal justice system and the price
that society necessarily pays for the increased assurance that federal constitutional standards are
respected. The price is undeniably high. In theory, habeas corpus operates upon the person of the
custodian, demanding justification for a citizen's detention whenever the validity of that confinement is questioned. The focus, then, is not directly on the judgment upon which a prisoner's
sentence rests, but on the validity of the applicant's custody simpliciter. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963). For that reason, habeas is available on a continuing basis. The resulting subordination of state interests in the "finality" of criminal judgments has generated considerable concern
over the years. See Bator, supra note 11. I find the values protected by the writ well worth the
price. While I suspect Professor Robbins does as well, he is scrupulous in giving voice to divergent
points of view.
86. The book offers, for example, good illustrations of the complexity that can accompany
the jurisdictional requirement that habeas applicants be in "custody" at the time they apply for
federal relief. In addition, there are good materials on the nonjurisdictional, but equally important, requirement that federal habeas applicants exhaust state judicial remedies. Still, I should
have preferred a deeper investigation of the intricacies of both doctrines, and greater attention to
the relationship between the two.
Taking the "custody" requirement first, the most difficult questions arise when prisoners
attempt to challenge present sentences to confinement that were influenced by allegedly invalid
prior convictions and when prisoners confined in one state attempt to challenge convictions
obtained in another. The essential questions are these: In whose "custody" are such prisoners for
purposes of habeas corpus litigation? Once the custodian is identified, and the subject matter
jurisdiction of a particular district court is assured, does that court have personal jurisdiction of
the custodian? If so, how? See Carter v. Hardy, 526 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 838 (1976) (stating the general rule that a petitioner is no longer in "custody" under, and
thus cannot challenge, a conviction the sentence for which has already been served). But see
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (making it clear that a petitioner's present sentence
can be attacked on the ground that it was affected by a prior conviction the sentence for which
has expired). Compare Harrison v. Indiana, 597 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir, 1979) (illustrating that
even when the gravamen of the challenge is the invalidity of a previous conviction the present
habeas attack is in theory focused on the prisoner's current confinement and the relief sought is at
least a reduction in sentence) with Jackson v. Louisiana, 452 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1971)
(apparently finding a prisoner currently confined under a different sentence still to be in
"custody" under a previous conviction the sentence for which has been served-if that prior
conviction invalidly influenced the length of the prisoner's present sentence) and Carter v.
Estelle, 677 F.2d 427, 450-51 n.22 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that it is "unsettled" in the Fifth
Circuit whether the use of an earlier conviction for enhancement purposes satisfies the "custody"
doctrine for an attack on the former conviction itself), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1508 (1983). See
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 500 (1973) (holding that a prisoner confined
in one state but challenging actions taken by the authorities in another state can petition for
habeas relief in a federal district court in either-on the ground that the prisoner is in the
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itly suggests, 7 primarily because habeas litigation is often undertaken
by undereducated prison inmates proceeding pro se. 88 The very ignorance of "jailhouse lawyers," however understandable, can generate
some of the most perplexing procedural questions faced by the federal
bench-questions made no less baffling by the knowledge that they

"custody" of the confinement state authorities by virtue of physical detention and in the "custody" of the authorities in the other state by and through a "detainer" filed by those authorities
with the confinement state warden). Compare Norris v. Georgia, 522 F.2d 1006, 1012 (4th Cir.
1975) (holding that while a petitioner may challenge the actions of foreign state authorities in the
district of confinement those authorities are not necessarily within the personal jurisdiction of a
district court in the confinement state and thus any habeas relief issued by that court cannot run
to them) with id. at 1014 (Winter, J., concurring & dissenting) (arguing that a "detainer" filed
by foreign state authorities suffices to establish both "custody" and in personam jurisdiction in
the confinement district). Cf. Ott v. Ciccone, 326 F. Supp. 609, 612 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (finding
similar difficulties arising in cases in which prisoners attempt to challenge actions taken by
federal parole authorities residing in Washington by way of habeas petitions in the district of
confinement).
The exhaustion doctrine constitutes an overlay, raising still further questions. In interstate
cases, which state's remedies must be exhausted prior to federal habeas litigation? Those in the
state of confinement? Conviction? Both? Neither? See Jackson, 452 F.2d at 454 (requiring a
California prisoner seeking habeas relief in a district court in Louisiana on the theory that a prior
Louisiana conviction was preventing him from obtaining parole in California to exhaust California remedies before seeking relief from a federal court in either state). Compare Braden, 410
U.S. at 489 (noting that the Alabama prisoner at bar had exhausted Kentucky state remedies
before seeking federal habeas relief against Kentucky authorities in a district court sitting in
Kentucky) with Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1970) (requiring a California prisoner
attacking the effect being given a "detainer" filed by North Carolina authorities to exhaust
California remedies before seeking federal habeas relief in a district court in California). But see
Sacco v. Falke, 649 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1981) (apparently requiring the exhaustion of Ohio
remedies before permitting a prisoner serving a federal sentence in a state penitentiary in North
Dakota to seek vaguely-defined relief from actions taken by Ohio authorities).
87. The book's initial chapters treat the problems presented by pro se and forma pauperis
litigation in the federal courts. See generally Catz & Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search of Judicial Standards, 31 RUTCERS L. REV. 655 (1978); Jacob & Sharma, Justice
After Trial: Prisoners'Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-CorrectionalProcess, 18 U. KAN.
L. REV. 493 (1970); Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se
Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 157 (1972).
88. P. ROBINSON, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus REVIEW OF STATE COURT

56 (1979) (reporting that "more than 78.8%" of the petitioners studied had not been
represented by counsel). The Court has never held that there is a constitutional right to counsel
in post-conviction proceedings. Cf. Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 7 n.2 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (stating that there is no such right in state post-conviction proceedings). But cf. Roach
v. Bennett, 392 F.2d 743, 747-48 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that in exceptional circumstances the
appointment of counsel may be necessary to fundamental fairness); accord United States ex rel.
Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960); cf. also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977) (holding that prisoners' constitutional entitlement to access to the courts requires penal
authorities to provide inmates with either counsel or a prison library to use in representing
themselves). See generally Comment, Right to Counsel in Criminal Post-Conviction Review
Proceedings, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 970 (1963); Comment, Right to Counsel in Federal Collateral
Attack Proceedings: Section 2255, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 583 (1963). Under current practice,
counsel is appointed only after a pro se petitioner makes out a colorable claim. Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976) (establishing statutory authority).
Counsel must be appointed, however, in any case in which effective use of discovery techniques
requires it, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6(a) (1982), or in which a federal evidentiary hearing is to be
held, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 8(c) (1982). In federal post-conviction proceedings counsel may be
furnished and compensated under the Criminal Justice Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1976).
JUDGMENTS
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might have been avoided by professional counsel.89 Congress has occasionally adopted legislation designed to streamline the habeas process, 90 and in 1976 two sets of procedural rules were promulgated to
guide the district courts.9 1 Those guidelines are woven into the materials when they are relevant. In sum, students are treated to an
elaborate illustration of the way in which cooperative federalism can
work. These materials would be excellent teaching tools notwithstanding their genuine significance in the concrete world of American
criminal justice. Their exploration promises to sharpen the analytical
skills and tune the judgment of anyone who would understand the
making and enforcement of legal standards in a bifurcated system.
Equally important, the materials Professor Robbins presents very
much do describe the criminal justice system as it actually operates.
While other books, intended for standard courses in criminal procedure

2

or federal jurisdiction 9

3

may touch upon post-conviction reme-

dies-a topic that sits somewhere between the two fields 4-this book
offers, for the first time, a thorough exploration of the fundamental
structure within which federal issues are actually determined in the
United States today.
III
Professor Robbins concludes his casebook with a chapter entitled
"The Future of the Great Writ." The leading case in that chapter is
Stone, an unfortunate choice for reasons already noted. Realistically,
the writ's future depends upon Justice Rehnquist's ability to attract
support to his cause. To date, the evidence is mixed. While some of

89. ROBINSON, supra note 88, at 56-63 (discussing the difficulties caused by pro se litigants).
90. The best illustration is the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948 which recognized a
diluted res judicata doctrine in habeas, simplified the conduct of evidentiary hearings, codified
the exhaustion doctrine, and established a post-conviction remedy in the nature of coram nobis
for use by federal prisoners attacking federal convictions and sentences.
91. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (governing
habeas applications challenging state court judgments); Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts (controlling post-conviction motions filed by federal
prisoners attacking federal judgments). See generally Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas
Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IOWA L. REV.
15 (1977) (providing some glimpses of the legislative history).
92. E.g., Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ch. 27 (5th
ed. 1980); F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, ch.
26 (2d ed. 1982).
93. D. CURRE, FEDERAL COURTS, ch. 7(3) (3d ed. 1982); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &
H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, ch. X (2d ed.
1973).
94. Recently published casebooks in the general field of civil rights legislation may include
materials on habeas corpus. But, again, the treatment is necessarily superficial. See, e.g., C.
ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIrHTS, ch. 1 (1980) (noting habeas only in the course of explicating the civil
rights statutes); T. EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION, ch. 5 (1981) (treating habeas as an
illustration of conflicts that arise between the state and federal courts).
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the Justices now sitting do not share the enthusiasm for habeas that
was much in evidence when Townsend and Noia were decided, the
full Court has resisted wholesale departures in this field. The essential
radicalism of Justice Rehnquist's position, and the want of support for
it in the cases, will lead, one should hope, to its failure.9 5
No one who reads the federal advance sheets can deny that federal
habeas corpus presents difficulties. Though far fewer habeas petitions
are filed than some seem to suppose, the number of applications for
relief is sizeable, and it is plain that many demand the expenditure of
substantial judicial resources before disposition. 6 Of course, the sheer
weight of habeas litigation alone hardly makes the case against collateral review. Critics must demonstrate that many applications are
without merit and that judicial resources are thus squandered upon
them. There the argument breaks down. For, again, anyone who
reads the advance sheets knows that the greater proportion of judicial
time in habeas cases is spent wrestling with threshold procedural
matters of extraordinary complexity. Two distinct responses to the
problems presented by habeas corpus have been offered to date. The
first proposes to educate would-be lawyers in habeas lore, so that in
the future prisoners might be represented by attorneys who can avoid
procedural difficulty in the first instance or thread their way through
it when necessary. In this context as in so many others, the efficient
course, and the course that promises long-term benefits to all concerned, is the course of fairness to the currently weak. The way to
95. The debate within the Court has not gone unnoticed in the lower courts, though the
divergent opinions among federal judges rarely refer directly to the Rehnquist opinions upon
which I want to focus. Compare United States ex rel. Jones v. Franzen, 676 F.2d 261, 268 (7th
Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., concurring) (complaining that the federal habeas courts routinely relitigate questions of fact) with Coode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941, 941 (11th Cir. 1982) (Godbold,
C.J.) (acknowledging the "sharply differing views over whether our law ought to provide" for
post-conviction habeas review but pointing out that "the law of our country does provide for it"
and that "federal court judges take an oath to carry out that law") (emphasis in original). See
generally Martin v. Blackburn, 521 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. La. 1981) (blaming Congress for the
operation of post-conviction habeas); Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F. Supp. 947 (M.D. Fla. 1981)
(same). On occasion, the debate becomes colorful. Compare In re Bizzard, 559 F. Supp. 507,
512 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (declaring that the "incredible ease and related expense of a prisoner's access
to the court is not more misplaced than in this case" in which the prisoner might better adopt a
"dedication to self-betterment and the values of his parents" than continue his "war with
society") with Gibson v. Zant, 547 F. Supp. 1270, 1271 (M.D. Ga. 1982) (viewing habeas as
"just one of many distasteful tasks that Congress has assigned to state citizens serving as United
States District Judges and that must be performed. . . regardless of their personal likes or
dislikes"), aff'd, 705 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983).
96. We would do well to distinguish post-conviction attacks upon state criminal convictions
from other kinds of "prisoner petitions" with which they are occasionally confused. See Turner,
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L.
REV. 610 (1979). Collateral attack petitions make up a very small part of the federal caseload,
and their numbers have remained roughly constant over the last few years. While civil rights
actions filed by state prisoners increased 115.6% between 1971 and 1982, habeas challenges to
state convictions increased only 17.4 % in the same period. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIEcroR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 103 (1982). In 1982, all state prisonerinitiated lawsuits accounted for only 12.1% of the full civil caseload. Id. at 100.
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bring habeas into control is to provide indigent petitioners with the
means to cope with the system they face-competent professional
representation. If that were done, we would be more entitled than we
are now to demand that habeas petitioners turn square corners as they
pursue federal relief. In the end, the federal courts would waste less
time on misguided doctrines, themselves intended to enhance efficiency but actually having precisely the opposite effect, and comparatime would be spent on the merits of constitutional
tively more
7
claims.1
The second response is, on reflection, no response at all. Cynically,
we can continue to insist upon procedural barriers and related doctrinal wrinkles that only frustrate pro se petitioners. We can say that we
expect prisoners to understand the complexities with which they are
presented and in that light box them out of the federal forum when, in
fact, they do not understand and fail to comply. We can express
surprise and impatience when, in their attempts to satisfy, prisoners
actually create theoretical problems that, in turn, require judicial
effort to resolve. To persist in this vein is to make matters worse and to
feed an understandable, but wholly unjustifiable, suspicion that federal collateral review is not worth the price we pay for it. With due
respect, I must conclude that this is what Justice Rehnquist intends.
There being no other tenable explanation for his insistence on procedural niceties of doubtful utility in this of all fields, I conclude that he
would bury post-conviction habeas in artificial procedural demands
that cannot reasonably be met. The goal is not greater efficiency but
an effective end to the enterprise.
The fundamental point of this discussion bears repeating. Postconviction review of state judgments by the federal habeas courts
constitutes a vital component of American criminal justice. It is time
that law schools recognize as much and offer courses to bring the truth
home to students and would-be practitioners in the criminal courts.
Now that a good casebook is available on the national market, perhaps such courses will be offered more widely. If that happens, the
system's efficiency will surely be enhanced. For, again, federal habeas
corpus has long suffered from professional neglect. Petitioners have

97. A word from Professor Wright should suffice:
It is not obvious that it is a wise use of precious federal judicial time, or a service
to the states and the notion of federalism, to have many or most habeas corpus
petitions disposed of on procedural grounds. If the federal courts are free to reach the
merits, they will find in the overwhelming bulk of the cases that the petition should
be denied because the state courts have faithfully applied the commands of the
Federal Constitution. A rebuff to the prisoner on procedural grounds leaves a cloud,
however frivolous, over the state conviction and is simply an invitation to the
prisoner to try and try again in the hope that sometime, somehow, he can push the
right combination of buttons and obtain a decision on the merits.
Wright, Book Review, 81 MicH. L. REv. 802, 809-10 (1983) (reviewing W. DuKEa, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980)).
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coped as best they can alone, but the consequence has been extraordinary, and unnecessary, complexity. This, in fact, may be the one field
in which the introduction of lawyers may actually simplify matters,
contributing to the maintenance of the structure that Justice Frankfurter began to build decades ago."8

98. If there is any indication from the Court regarding the future of the writ, I think it is in
Justice Stevens' occasional statements linking the issues cognizable in habeas with the proper
response to abortive state proceedings. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 538 (1982) (dissenting
opinion). On several occasions, he has suggested that the Court should not routinely open federal
habeas to all constitutional claims, subject to the Sykes standards for determining the effect of
procedural default in state court-equally applicable no matter what issue is raised. Instead, the
scope of the writ should be narrowed to particularly serious violations of the Constitution, which
should be cognizable in habeas even if they were not preserved properly at trial. Accord
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 95-96 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). While Justice Stevens has
thus far failed to attract other Justices to his position, he did manage to place some vague
language tending toward his personal view in an opinion for the Court in Henderson v. Kibbe,
431 U.S. 145 (1977). But see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (declining one available
opportunity to achieve Justice Stevens' essential result by applying the federal "plain error" rule
in collateral proceedings).
On the one hand, I prefer Justice Stevens' forthright attempt to address the critical issues in
this field to Justice Rehnquist's campaign to frustrate habeas review in a maze of procedural
complexity. The key questions are whether, or the extent to which, the lower federal courts
should be open for the relitigation of federal claims. Serious approaches to habeas should
acknowledge as much. On the other hand, I find Justice Stevens' answer, the suggestion that the
substantive scope of habeas should be narrowed, disturbing. There are alternatives. One is to
strip away the procedural underbrush that has grown up in the last twenty years and return to
the framework envisioned by Noia, Townsend, and Sanders in 1963. See supra note 30. Another
is to reexamine the habeas jurisdiction as only a component of a larger scheme for orchestrating
the distribution of authority and responsibility between the federal and state courts. I intend in a
future paper to attempt such a reexamination and in that light to defend the general availability
of federal habeas corpus as a sequel to state court adjudication of federal claims arising in state
criminal prosecutions.

